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Ayers v. State:
MARYLAND'S
"HATE CRIMES"
STATUTE
HELD NOT TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE
PETITIONER
LACKED STANDING
TO MAKE A FACIAL
CHALLENGE OF
THE STATUTE.

In Ayers v. State, 335
Md. 602, 645 A.2d 22 (1994),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a 4-3 decision, held that
Maryland's "hate crimes" statute, Maryland Annotated Code
article 27, Section 470A(b)(3)(i),
was not unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case.
The court did not reach the question of whether the statute is
indefinite and has a chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment liberties because
the court held that Ayers lacked
standing to make such a challenge of the statute. Nonetheless, by so holding, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland sent a
strong message to Maryland citizens that crimes motivated by
racial prejudice will not be tolerated.
On the evening of March
2, 1992, Petitioner John
Randolph Ayers and his friend,
Sean Riley, discussed a racial
incident that occurred at an area
7-Eleven store several nights
earlier in which Ayers confronted a black male teenager, shouted racial epithets at him and
knocked him to the ground. In
addition, Ayers shouted racial
epithets at a black female teenager and chased her. After discussing this earlier incident,
Ayers and Riley saw two black
women walking and began to
chase them. Riley chased one
woman, Myrtle Guillory, and
Ayers chased the other, Johnnie
Mae McCrae. Guillory managed to safely reach a friend's
house and called the police;
Ayers abducted McCrae,
dragged her into the woods,

threatened to kill her, and attempted to set her on fire by
spraying charcoal lighter fluid
on her. Ayers was indicted in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for assault, assault
with intent to maim, kidnapping, conspiracy to commit a
racially motivated crime, and
committing a racially motivated
crime in violation of the "Hate
Crimes" statute, Section
470A(b)(3)(i).
At trial, Guillory and
McCrae testified as to the incident. Riley, testifYingasa State's
witness, said that he and Ayers
went out that evening to find
black people to beat up because
they were angry about the 7Eleven incident that had occurred several nights before. In
addition, Riley corroborated
Guillory and McCrae's testimony as to the facts of the case.
Ayers disputed all of this testimony, stating that the incident
occurred because he and Riley
were provoked by the black
women. During cross-examination, Ayers admitted that the
7-Eleven confrontation was racial in nature and that he had
chased some black people because he was upset.
The defense made several motions for mistrial based
on the theories that the prosecution was trying to get Ayers to
incriminate himself on the other
charge and that the prosecution's use of Lisa Walker, one
of the black teenagers from the
7-Eleven incident, was inadmissible testimony. The trial court
ultimately overruled each motion for mistrial, holding that
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Walker's testimony was proper
because it tended to show motive which is an element of the
offense of committing a racially
motivated crime under Section
470A(b)(3)(i). However, the
court did givethejury a cautionary instruction stating that certain acts that occurred during
the 7-Eleven incident were not
to be considered by the jury in
determining their ultimate decision; they were merely to establish proof Defense counsel stated that they were satisfied with
this instruction.
Lastly, in its instruction
to the jury, the court made the
following statement: "[t]hedefendant is also charged with the
racially motivated crime. It is a
crime to harass or commit a
crime upon a person because of
that person's race, color, religious beliefs, or national origin." In addition, the State used
the term "harass" during its
closing argument. Defense
counsel did not object to the
instruction or the closing argument. Ayers was subsequently
found guilty on all counts and
was sentenced to incarceration
for a total of sixty years.
Ayers appealed his conviction based on four arguments.
First, Ayers argued that his convictionunder Section 470Amust
be overturned because Section
470A on its face violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments in that the part of the
statute prohibiting "harassment" of someone based on
race is unconstitutionally vague,
fails to provide fair notice as to
what behavior constitutes "ha-

rassment," and creates a danger
ofarbitrary enforcement. Ayers,
335 Md. at 619,645 A.2d at 30.
Ayers also contended that the
statute is overbroad because
"harass" was not defined, and
that the statute is a contentbased regulation of speech
which cannot be justified. Id.
Second, Ayers argued that the
statute was unconstitutional as
applied in this case because by
allowing the 7-Eleven testimony into evidence, the court allowed prejudicial and irrelevant
testimony which prevented him
from receiving a fair trial. Furthermore, the trial judge erred
by not weighing the probative
value of the testimony against
its prejudicial impact. Id. at
620, 645 A.2d at 30-31. Third,
Ayers attacked the sufficiency
of evidence presented to convict him under Section 470A,
arguing that the only evidence
that his acts were racially motivated came from his accomplice, Riley, and therefore his
conviction violated the rule that
a person may not be convicted
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Id. at 621,
645 A.2d at 3l. Ayers' final
argument was that the court
abused its discretion in sentencing him to a sixty year prison
term which constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari prior to review by the court of special
appeals.
In its analysis of Ayers'
first argument, the court of appeals noted that Ayers was not
charged under the harassment

portion of Section 470A. Ayers
acknowledged this but argued
that the jury may have convicted him of harassment based on
the court's instruction and the
State's closing argument which
both mentioned the word "harass." Id. at 626, 645 A.2d at
33. The court pointed out that
Ayers never raised any objection to the use of the term "harass" by the court and the State,
and therefore Ayers was precluded from raising this issue on
appeal. Id. at 627-28,645 A.2d
at 34. In addition, the court
refused to believe that using the
word "harass" in the jury instruction and the closing argument was sufficient to lead the
jury to conclude that Ayers was
charged with, and could be convicted for, mere harassment. Id.
at 628, 645 A.2dat34-35. Lastly, the court held that the record
was devoid of evidence that,
during the attack ofthe victims,
Ayers was engaged in any semblance of constitutionally protected speech that was considered by the jury in determining
his guilt. Id. at 627,645 A.2d at
34. Therefore, the court concluded that "Ayers lack[ed]
standing to challenge the statute facially on the basis that the
harassment prong of Section
470A [was] vague and overbroad." Id. at 629, 645 A.2d at
35.
As to Ayers' second argument, the court of appeals
carefully reiterated the general
rule that "evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts may
not be introduced to prove guilt
of the offense for which the
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defendant is on trial" because
ofthe danger that the defendant
will not be able to receive a fair
trial. Id. at 630-31,645 A.2d at
35. The court, though, noted
that several exceptions exist to
this general rule, one being that
evidence of other crimes is admissible if it tends to establish
motive. Id. at 631,645 A.2d at
36. In prior cases, the court held
that evidence of another crime
is admissible if the other crime
tends to directly prove the guilt
of the defendant in the case at
hand, or if the other crime is so
linked with the crime at hand
that one cannot be proven withouttheother. Id. at631-32, 645
A.2d at 36 (citing Bryant v.
State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d
502 (1955) and Ross v. State,
276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680
(1976)). The court outlined a
three-step procedure to be followed by a trial court when
determining whether to admit
evidence of other crimes: 1)
determine ifthe evidence is one
of the longstanding exceptions
to the general rule; 2) if the
evidence is an exception, decide
whether the defendant's involvement in the other crimes is established by clear and convincing evidence; and 3) if the second requirement is met, weigh
the probative value of the evidence against any prejudice toward the defendant that would
result from allowing it into evidence. Ayers 335 Md. at 632,
645 A.2d at 36-37.
In analyzing these steps,
the court determined that the
trial court did not err in its determination that the evidence was

admissible because: 1) the evidence was admitted to show
motive; 2) the prosecution established Ayers' involvement in
the 7-Eleven incident through
the testimony ofRiley and Walker; and 3) the trial judge concluded that the probative value
of the evidence outweighed its
prejudicial impact. Id. at 63335, 645 A.2d at 37-38. The
court ultimately found that the
trial court did not err when it
denied defense counsel's several motions for mistrial and admitted into evidence testimony
regarding the 7-Eleven incident.
With regard to Ayers'
third argument, the court held
that Riley's testimony was indeed corroborated by the testimony ofWalker and the various
police officers. Id. at 638, 645
A.2d at 39-40. Though Walker
and the other witnesses did not
corroborate Riley's testimony
with regard to Ayers' motive in
the crimes, they did corroborate
Riley's testimony as to Ayers'
participation in the crime. The
court noted that if the corroborative testimony shows the participation of the accused in the
crime itself, "the trier of fact
may credit the accomplice's testimony even with respect to
matters as to which no corroborative testimony was adduced." Id. at 638,645 A.2d at
39.
With regard to Ayers'
cruel and unusual punishment
claim, the court reviewed prior
cases where it held that "a sentence is unconstitutional only if
it is 'grossly disproportionate'
to the crime committed by the
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defendant." Id. at 639, 645
A.2d at 40 (quoting Thomas v.
State, 333 Md. 84, 634 A.2d 1
(1993)). Because the sentences
were within the permissible statutory and common law limits,
the court held that the sentences
were not unconstitutionally disproportionate. Id. at 640, 645
A.2d at 41. The court noted
that a trial judge is vested with
discretion in imposing sentences, and there was no evidence in
the record to support the conclusion that an abuse of discretion occurred in this case. Ayers
at 640-41, 645 A.2d at 41.
Therefore, the Court ofAppeals
of Maryland affirmed the decision ofthe trial court, upholding
Maryland's "Hate Crimes" statute as applied to the facts of
Ayers' case. Id. at 642, 645
A.2d at 41.
In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Bell, joined by Justices
Chasanow and Raker, argued
that the 7-Eleven incident should
not have been admitted into
evidence because this testimony did not prove Ayers' motive
in the case; it merely established
Ayers as a bigot. Id. at 646-47,
645 A.2d at 42-43. Bell wentto
great lengths to clarify this distinction: evidence that Ayers
was a bigot only proved that he
was a bigot-it did not prove
that the 7-Eleven incident was
the precipice to the crime at
hand, and therefore, this evidence did not prove Ayers'
motive. Id. at 651-52,645 A.2d
at 46-48. Therefore, Bell concluded that the testimony regarding the 7-Eleven incident
should not have been admitted
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into evidence, and Ayers' conviction based on Section
470A(b)(3)(i) should have been
overturned. Id. at 660, 645
A.2d at 50-51.
By holding that Maryland's "Hate Crimes" statute is
not unconstitutional as applied
to the facts in Ayers v. State, the

Blaine v. Blaine:
INDEFINITE
ALIMONY MAY BE
AWARDED
PURSUANT TO
AN EXTENSION OF
REHABILITATIVE
ALIMONY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland
sent a warning to all Maryland
citizens that crimes motivated
by racial prejudice will not be
tolerated. In so holding, the
core of this opinion was that
racial prejudice, by itself, will
not be condoned, and when it is
coupled with the commission of

a crime, it will be separately
punished. The court spoke with
amoral conscience, and charged
all Maryland citizens to uphold
this moral code by respecting
the differences of all humankind.
- Andrea S. Holz

Indefinite alimony may
be granted upon the termination
of a fixed period of rehabilitative alimony, ifit is determined
that circumstances have arisen
since the divorce which would
render termination inequitable.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Blaine v.
Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d
413 (1994), broadened a trial
court's discretion in extending
indefinitely an original award of
rehabilitative alimony under sections 11-106 and 11-107 of the
Family Law Article of the Annotated Code ofMaryland. Additionally, the court concluded
that an award of indefinite alimony would be supported ifthe
divorced parties' respective
standards of living were found
to be unconscionably disparate,
and the formerly dependent
spouse had made as much
progress toward becoming self-

supporting as could reasonably
be expected.
InNovember 1985, Ms.
Blaine was granted an absolute
divorce in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, and was
awarded rehabilitative alimony
in the amount of $800.00 per
month for a period of sixty
months. The alimony award
was based on evidence that Dr.
Blaine, Ms. Blaine's husband,
earned a salary in excess of
$62,000.00 a year compared to
Ms. Blaine's income which totaled $10,000.00 a year. In
granting a fixed period ofalimony, the circuit court took into
consideration the fact that Ms.
Blaine was working towards a
master's degree in health promotion counseling, which she
anticipated would lead to a positionearning$40,OOO.00ayear.
Approximately five
years later, Ms. Blaine made a
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